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Summary
Network-centric warfare (NCW) is a key element of the Department of the Navy’s
effort to transform itself to meet 21st Century military challenges.  NCW focuses on
using information technology to link together Navy ships, aircraft, and shore
installations into highly integrated networks.  NCW could significantly improve U.S.
naval capabilities and lead to substantial changes in naval tactics, doctrine, and
organization.  Key programs for implementing NCW include the Cooperative
Engagement Capability  (CEC), the Naval Fires Network (NFN), the IT-21 program, and
ForceNet.  A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).  Congress has
closely followed and expressed concern for some of these programs, particularly NMCI.
This report may be updated if developments warrant.
Network-Centric Warfare
The concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) emerged in the late 1990s and is a
key element of the Department of the Navy’s (DoN’s) effort to transform itself to meet
21st Century military challenges.1  NCW focuses on using advanced information
technology (IT) – computers, high-speed data links, and networking software – to link
together Navy ships, aircraft, and shore installations into highly integrated local and wide-
area networks.  Within these networks, Navy and Marine Corps personnel will share large
amounts of critical information on a rapid and continuous basis.  DoN believes that NCW
will dramatically improve naval combat capability and efficiency.2
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Key NCW Programs
Key programs for implementing NCW include the Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) program, the Naval Fires Network (NFN), the IT-21 investment
strategy, and the ForceNet program.  A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet
(NMCI).  Each of these is discussed below.  In addition to these programs, the Navy in
June 2002 established a new Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM),
headed by an admiral, to be the central operational authority responsible for coordinating
all IT, information operations, and space requirements and operations within the Navy.
CEC.  The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system links Navy ships and
aircraft operating in a particular area into a single, integrated air-defense network in which
radar data collected by each platform is transmitted on a real-time (i.e., instantaneous)
basis to the other units in the network.  Each unit in the CEC network fuses its own radar
data with data received from the other units.  As a result, units in the network share a
common, composite, real-time air-defense picture.  CEC will permit a ship to shoot air-
defense missiles at incoming anti-ship missiles that the ship itself cannot see, using radar
targeting data gathered by other units in the network.  It will also permit air-defense
missiles fired by one ship to be guided by other ships or aircraft.  The Navy wants to
install the system on aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, selected
amphibious ships, and E-2C Hawkeye carrier-based airborne early warning aircraft over
the next several years.3 The system has potential for being extended to include Army and
Air Force systems.
Tests of CEC aboard Navy ships in 1998 revealed significant interoperability (i.e.,
compatibility) problems between CEC’s software and the software of the air-defense
systems on some ships, particularly surface combatants equipped with the Baseline 6
version (then the most recent version) of the Navy’s Aegis air defense system.  In
response, the Navy undertook a major two-year effort to identify, understand, and fix the
problems.  The CEC system, with the new fixes, passed its technical evaluation
(TECHEVAL) testing in February and March 2001 and final operational evaluation
(OPEVAL) testing in April and May 2001.  In April 2002, DoD approved the program to
enter “Milestone III” in the acquisition process, and approved production of CEC systems
for FY2002 and FY2003 at a rate of 5 units per year.  A further “Milestone B” review of
the program was scheduled for April 2003.
Raytheon has been the primary CEC contractor but faced potential competition from
two firms – Lockheed and a small firm called Solipsys – for developing the next version
of CEC, called CEC Block II.  Solipsys had devised an alternative technical approach to
CEC, called the Tactical Component Network (TCN), which it said would reduce the
amount of data-transmission bandwidth capacity required by CEC and thereby help the
Navy contend with limitations on available bandwidth capacity.  Solipsys entered into a
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teaming arrangement with Lockheed  to offer TCN to the Navy as the technical approach
for Block II.  Raytheon proposed staying with the current technical approach for Block
II, arguing that the Navy had already invested heavily in this approach, and that Raytheon
had since improved it to reduce its use of bandwidth.
In late-December 2002, Raytheon announced that it had agreed to purchase Solipsys.
The acquisition is undergoing antitrust review.  In early-February 2003, Raytheon and
Lockheed announced that they had formed a team to compete for the development of
Block II.  Since Solipsys and Lockheed were generally considered to be Raytheon’s
strongest potential competitors for Block II, some observers have expressed concern that
these developments will reduce or eliminate the Navy’s ability to effectively use
competition as part of its acquisition strategy for Block II.4
NFN.  The Naval Fires Network, also called the Joint Fires Network (JFN), links
naval forces operating in an area into a single real-time targeting network for coordinating
gunfire and missiles to attack surface and land targets, particularly time-critical targets.
The Navy experimented with NFN in several exercises and is now working to accelerate
the introduction of the system into the fleet.  Concerns have been expressed that NFN,
like CEC, may use significant amounts of the Navy’s limited amount of available
bandwidth.  As of December 2002, the Navy reportedly had deployed versions of the NFN
system aboard several ships, with the Marines, and at Bahrain, where the Navy’s 5th Fleet
is headquartered.5  Additional NFN systems could be provided by either Northrop
Grumman or an industry team composed of BAE, Lockheed, and Raytheon.  The Navy
has not clarified whether it intends to have these two sources compete for future NFN
installations or award an NFN contract to one of them on a sole-source basis.
IT-21.  IT-21, which stands for IT for the 21st Century, is the Navy’s investment
strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed
to establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and
between Navy ships.  The IT-21 network uses commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) desktop
computers and networking software that provide a multimedia (text, data, graphics,
images, voice, and video) organizational intranet similar to the Capitol Hill intranet or
corporate intranets.  The Navy plans to complete the IT-21 network by FY2007.  The
Navy believes IT-21 will significantly improve U.S. naval warfighting capability and
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achieve substantial cost reductions by significantly reducing the time and number of
people required to carry out various tactical and administrative functions.6
ForceNet.  ForceNet (also typed as FORCEnet), which emerged as a named
concept in 2002 and is still being defined, is the Navy’s overall approach for linking
various networks that contribute to naval NCW into a single capstone information
network for U.S. naval forces.  The Navy has highlighted ForceNet as being at the center
of its Sea Power 21 transformation vision, and states that ForceNet “is the operational
construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age which
integrates warriors, weapons, sensors, networks, command and control, and platforms into
a networked, distributed combat force....  FORCEnet is the implementation of network
centric warfare in the naval services and will provide the means for an exponential
increase in naval combat power.”7  Some observers have criticized ForceNet for being
insufficiently defined.8  The conference report (H.Rept. 107-732 of October 9, 2002) on
the FY2003 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5010/P.L. 107-248) expressed concern
about “the lack of specificity and documentation on the program,” and directed the Navy
to submit a detailed report on it by May 1, 2003.  (page 279).
NMCI.  The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is a corporate-style intranet that
will link more than 300 Navy and Marine Corps shore installations in much the same way
that the IT-21 effort will link together Navy ships.9  When completed in 2003, NMCI will
include a total of 365,070 computer work stations, or “seats.”  In October 2000, the Navy
awarded an industry team led by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation a $6.9
billion, 5-year contract for installing, supporting, and periodically upgrading the NMCI.
In October 2002, Congress, through P.L. 107-254, authorized a 2-year extension to this
contract.   A total of 160,000 NMCI seats have been authorized; as of May 30, 2003, a
total of 80,770 had been “cut over” to the system.  The Navy plans to have all 365,070
seats implemented by the end of FY2003, but the system must pass certain tests and
reviews before it can be fully implemented.10  The Administrations is requesting $1.6
billion in FY2004 and a total of $9.5 billion in the FY2004-FY2009 Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP) for the NMCI program.
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The 106th Congress expressed concern over the difficulty of identifying the total cost
of the NMCI effort in Navy budget documents, the Navy’s ability to finance NMCI effort
without disrupting other important Navy programs, the pace at which the Navy planned
to implement NMCI, the Navy’s ability to properly structure and manage the huge NMCI
contract (the largest networking-services IT contract undertaken by a federal agency), the
potential impact of NMCI implementation on employees of existing naval networking and
telecommunications systems, and whether the network should be extended to cover
installations in the Marine Corps, which already had its own service-wide network.
In response, the Navy took actions to improve the visibility of NMCI costs in its
budget, stated that the NMCI would be financed to a large degree using funds
programmed for older IT procurement programs that the NMCI will supercede, stated that
implementing NMCI would have only a small net employment impact, and argued that
implementing NMCI in the Marine Corps as well as the Navy would result in greater
efficiencies and lower overall costs for the two services.  At Congress’ direction, the plan
for implementing NMCI was restructured to begin with a smaller number of initial
installations, so that the success of the NMCI effort could be more carefully assessed
before the program was expanded to cover larger parts of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
The 107th Congress expressed substantial concerns regarding the implementation and
testing of the NMCI system.  Section 362 of the conference report (H.Rept. 107-333 of
December 12, 2001) on the FY2002 defense authorization act (S. 1438/P.L. 107-107)
permitted the Navy to proceed with the NMCI project only after meeting certain testing
requirements.  The provision also required the Navy to submit a report on the status of
NMCI testing and the implementation of the NMCI network, and to identify a single
individual whose sole responsibility will be to direct and oversee the NMCI program.
(The Navy in February  2002 announced that it had created a single program office to
manage the NMCI program, headed by an admiral.  An NMCI senior executive council
headed by the Navy’s acquisition executive will provide senior-level review of the
program office.)  The provision required GAO to study the impact of NMCI
implementation on the rate structure of naval shipyards and other repair depots.  (GAO
submitted its report [GAO-03-33] on October 31, 2002.)  The conference report also
expressed concern about delays in implementing the program and the resulting shortage
of data about the viability and performance of NMCI.  (See pages 55-57 and 641-642.)
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 107-532 of June 25,
2002) on the FY2003 defense appropriation bill (H.R. 5010/P.L. 107-248), commented
extensively on the NMCI program, expressing concerns over the incorporation of
“legacy” computer programs into the network and the adequacy of the testing program.
(pages 198-199)  The conference report on the bill (H.Rept. 107-732 of October 9, 2002)
expressed continuing concerns for the NMCI program and included a provision (Section
8118) prohibiting the Navy from ordering additional seats beyond the 160,000 already
authorized until certain conditions are met. (pages 48, 106-107, and 329)
Potential Issues for 108th Congress
NMCI Implementation and Testing.  One potential issue for Congress concerns
the Navy’s progress in implementing and testing the NMCI system.
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CEC Block II Acquisition Strategy.  A second potential issue concerns the
technical approach for CEC Block II and the Navy’s ability to effectively use competition
as part of its acquisition strategy for Block II.
NFN Acquisition Strategy.  A third potential issue concerns whether the Navy
intends to have industry compete for future NFN installations or award an NFN contract
to one of them on a sole-source basis.
Questions concerning NCW in general.  Congress may consider other
potential issues relating to NCW in general, including the following:11
! Tactics, doctrine and organization:  The Navy recognizes that it needs
to develop new tactics, doctrine, and organizations to take full advantage
of NCW; this could significantly alter current practices and pose
challenges for retraining Navy personnel.
! Overall fleet design:  The Navy is currently adding NCW to its existing
overall fleet architecture.  The issue is whether the Navy has taken the
relatively new concept of NCW adequately into account in planning its
future fleet architecture.
! Bandwidth sufficiency:   If Navy transmission bandwidth capacity does
not grow sufficiently, or if use of it is not sufficiently managed,
implementation of NCW could be hindered.
! Allied interoperability:  If NATO and other allied navies invest in NCW-
enabling technologies, U.S.-allied naval interoperability could be
significantly increased; if they do not, maintaining naval interoperability
could become increasingly difficult.
! Information security: The Navy acknowledges that it needs to work on
measures for preventing, detecting, and responding to attempts by
outsiders to illegally enter the computer networks being created to
implement NCW.
Legislative Activity in 2003
FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588/S. 1050).  In its report
(H.Rept. 108-106 of May 16, 2003) on H.R. 1588, the House Armed Services
Committee recommended a $5.0-million increase for the NFN program (page 189) and
a $160-million reduction to the NMCI program (page 301).
In its report (S.Rept. 108-46 of May 13, 2003) on S. 1050, the Senate Armed
Services Committee recommended a provision (Section 361) that would permit the
Defense Information Systems Agency to sell working-capital funded services to
contractors that are working on the NMCI contract (page 293).
